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PREFACE
The purpose of this study is twofold. Mainly
it is a study of the reception that Marx's theory of
modernization encountered in the writings of P.N.
Tkachev, and of the transformation that it underwent
in the hands of Lenin. And in part, it traces the
development of Karxis t-Leninist theory of modernization,
as the Soviet theory of modernization is called, in
its relation to Soviet foreign policy in the non-
communist underdeveloped world.
In choosing a method for this study I have
encountered two widely accepted but conflicting
approaches. The first . emphasizes the context of
political, social and economic factors which determine
the meaning of political writings and, which consequently
must be reconstructed if we are to understand them.
Whatever are its merits, however, it is prone to serious
methodological problems. It is deterministic in that
it generates a belief that political writings are mere
reflections of their respective societies and their
historical eposhs. Furthermore, due to the rapid
changes of the socio-economic and political environment
iv
it assumes that tho political thinker will change his
views accordingly. It is precisely this type of
thinking, in ray opinion, that continues to cling to
the false dichotomy between the “young" and the “old"
Marx, and encourages the same trend in the study of
Lenin's political thought.
The second approach, and. the one adopted in
this study, emphasizes the importance of texts as being
sufficient in themselves for understanding the ideas
contained in them. This is not to say that it does not
recognize the influence of the social environment cr the
historical age on the works of a political thinker,
but rather that it allows a thinker the possibility
to transcend the particularities of his age and society.
Lastly, the text approach although sensitive to the
possibility of a political thinker contradicting him-
self or even changing his mind, it assumes that,
generally, during a life-time his thought does not
undergo a series of epistemological breaks, but is
rather characterized by continuity as we shall see
later in our discussion on Marx and Lenin.
The first part of this study traces the con-
cept of change and development in Western political
thought, and analyzes Marx's theory of modernization
and development. The second part examines the reception
and the transformation of Marx's theory of modernization
in the hands of Tkachev and Lenin respectively. And,
V
the final part traces the development of Marxist-
Leninist, or Soviet, theory of modernization in its
relation to Soviet foreign policy in the non- communist
underdeveloped countries since Lenin's death*
Before closing this prefatory note, I should
like to convey my appreciation to those who have helped
to make this study possible. First, I wish to express
my deepest gratitude to Professor Karl W. Ryavec under
whose supervision I have been priveleged to prepare this
study. His erudition, understanding and tolerance
are deeply apprecialted. To Professor Peter J. Fliess —
who guided my first steps in the study of Communist
Political thought — I owe my awareness of the insepar-
able link between Marx and Hegel, his advice has been of
immense help. I also wish to thank Professor Gerard
Braunthal for his part in the completion of this study
To Professor Ferenc A. Vali, for his friendly advice
and encouragement which are deeply appreciated. I also
wish to thank Professor Glen Gordon and Professor Robert
Shanley for their kindness in the past year. My wife
Barbara, has given help and advice throughout the
preparation of this study and, above all, lent her gift
of clarity whenever 1 needed it, which seemed to be
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The idea of social development is as old as
Western political thought, going back to ancient Athens
and Rome. It laakes its first appearance in the writings
of a pre~Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus, who perceived
change in every aspect of life, though mainly in
biological terms. Everything was always in a state of
flux or change; and this meant to Heraclitus that every-
thing in the state of perpetual transformation was grow-
ing and developing like plants and animals. On this
conception, of growth Heraclitus constructed his theory
of physis or nature, with nature conceived to be the
pattern of development and actualization found in each
and every object. Thus, an understanding of something,
whether a plant, an animal, a man or a polity, meant
knowing its pattern of development e This method is most
clearly manifested in Aristotle’s social theory, in
which inquiry is directed r.o an object's origins, its
j-Fcr two recent discussions of the Greek and
Roman conceptions of social development, see, Ludwig
Edelstein , The Idea of Progress in Cl a_ssip._al_
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967) , and Robert A, nisbe
»Social Chango and II is tory : Aspects of the.






form of growth, the processes that sustain the growth,
and the final purpose of the growth. In his The Politics
r
written in a period of decline of the Greek city-state,
Aristotle makes it clear that like organisms and plants,
states are also subject to organic growth. "The city-
state," writes Aristotle, "is a perfectly natural form of
association, as the earlier associations from which it
sprang...." 2 States, then, according to Aristotle, have
their origins and their purposes. They move inevitably
through their cycles, with one state emanating from
another, maturing and degenerating only to have the
process start all over again. Within this biological
framework, time being the sole requirement for growth
and development, the study of social life became identified
with the examination of relentless change.
In the hands of Augustine, a Christian thinker
of the Fifth Century, the Greek conception of social
change was incorporated into the sacred Judeo-Christian
tradition and evolved into a philosophy of history that
continues to influence Western social thought today.
In combining these idea3, Augustine was able to
alter the Greek conception of development in twTo significant
ways. First, Augustine conceived of universal rather than
^Aristotle. The Politics, trans. by T.A* Sinclair
'IM..WI I Mill* W
(Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1962), p. 28.
3
parochial development. That is, he applied the concept
of growth and development not just to particular societies,
but rather to mankind as a whole. And secondly, and
perhaps most important, he rejected the cyclical view of
history for an unilinear concept of development, unfolding
according to divine will and, in the process, lifting
to pre-eminence the idea of historical necessity. In
The City of God, Augustine makes it clear that the journey
from the city of man, the realm of evil, to the city of
God, the realm of spiritual good, represents a journey
of psychological and spiritual development even on earth.
In the 7\.ugustinian system, material development appears
to be irrelevant to psychological and spiritual develop
-ment
.
The social evolutionary theories of the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries were largely an
extension of the premises of "natural" and "necessary"
development, contained in the writings of Aristotle and
Augustine, to people whose history fell outside the realm
of Judco-Christian experience. Professor Barraclough
writes:
For the men of the Enlightenment the idea
of world history was particularly congenial.
It fitted with their notion of progress, their
view of mankind, advancing steadily from




Whatever were the differences between Hegel, Turgot, Vico
and Voltaire, they all shared the assumptions that social
change was natural, necessary and directional. They were,
on the whole, satisfied with what was; and, were committed
to rational and full understanding of the unfolding of the
universal order.
development underwent a dramatic transformation. The
theory became more revolutionary than evolutionary. Marx
discarded the notion of "natural" and gradual material
and psychological development and perceived social and
historical development as a result of human action. This
historical progress or development was a development of
human needs and the satisfaction of these needs „ Hence,
this progression v/as a dialectic one through an inter-
action between the passive, i.e„, the material or economic
element, and the active, i.e., the human element, “All
revolutions require a passive element, a materialist
basis," young Marx wrote in 1843 v "Theory is actualized
in a people only insofar as it actualizes their needs. "4
In the hands of Marx, the theory of social





r Loyd D. Gaston
k: Doubleday and
5
This method is best expressed in his later works 0 In his




It is not the consciousness of men that determines
their being, but, on the contrary, their social
being that determines their consciousness. . . • •
Therefore mankind always sets itself only such
tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter
more closely, it will always be found that the
task itself arises only when the material
conditions for its solution already exist or
are at least in the process of formation.
5
The development from a primitive consciousness to a more
modern consciousness is, according to Marx, conditioned
on the abolition of primitive economies and their replace
-went by modern economy, i»s e , capitalism. However,
through the awareness of this fact, man becomes an
essential part of this process and sees himself as an
actor rather than a helpless spectator. Consequently,
social development, for Marx, is not directed by a super-
natural invisible hand, but rather by human visible hands.
In Thesis on Feuerbach , a polemic tract against vulgar
or mechanistic materialism, Marx writes
:
The materialist doctrine that men are
products of circumstances and upbringing,
and that, therefore f changed men are products




Marx and Frederick Engels, Solectedm Nqi^kSf ,
Foreign Languages Publishing House, VjSQ)
,
6
forgets that it is men that change circum-
stances and that the educator himself needs
educating, » , . Social life is essentially
practical , . . . The philosophers have only
interpreted the world in various .ways; the
point , however, is to change it. 6
And, in contemporary political science literature, the
theorists of modern!nation, who usually define moderniza-
tion as political and social changes which accompany
industrialisation, are, though perhaps unaware, working
within a crude framework of Marxism. For, although Marx
does not use the term "modernization"
,
we do find a
pattern of thought in his writings, especially on India
and Russia, within which such a concept could derive
meaning and could develop. Or, as Professor Robert C.
Tucker remarked
,
"Although the term ' modernization 1
does not appear in Marx's and Engels' writings, the
O
theme frequently does."
However* whenever Marxist thought is taken into
consideration in the current debate on modernization, it
6 Ibid . . Vol. II, pp. 403-405.
^Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional
Approach to Comparative Politics" , in The Politics of the
Developing Areas , ed* by Gabriel A. Almond and James o
•
Coleman, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1070), pp. 9-26.
Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New
States— The Will to be Modern", in Read ings in Social
Evo.luv.ion and Development , ed. by Samuel N. Eisenstadt,
Toxford; Pergamon Press, 1970), pp. 330-381.
^Robert C. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary
Idea, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1369), p* S3.
7
generally tends to be confined to Lenin’s theory of
imperialism; which, though a significant component of
Marxist-Leninist thought today, is not an account of
Marx's contributions to the study of modernization. Marx
himself, the initiator of the theory of modernization,
is usually passed over in silence because Lenin and his
successors illegitimately but successfully claimed the
Marxian heritage. Let us then turn to an examination of
Marx's view of modernization emphasizing the revolutionary




Marx is known as a European thinker, primarily
interested in the impact of industrialization on Western
Europe, and above all, as a severe and uncompromising
critic of Nineteenth Century capitalism* Eut in order
to understand Marx as a revolutionary thinker, it is
essential that we recognize that he was a great admirer
9
of that technological progress which shook Europe*
Indeed, none of the liberal ?:pologists of capitalism
in his own time could match the enthusiasm that Marx
displayed in The Communist Manifesto in describing the
achievements of the bourgeoisie in this era:
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce
one hundred years, has created more massive
and more colossal productive forces than have
all preceding generations together. Subjection
of nature’s forces to man and machinery, the
application of chemistry to industry and
9Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision :
Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought ,
~( Boston: Little, Brown and Compnay, 1360) , p. 379*
"Although Das Kapital contained a biting indictment of
capitalism for its dehumanization of the worker, it al
expressed unabashed admiration for the new leviathan o
productive power created by capitalism...." See also
Friedrich Von Krosigk, "Marx, Universalism and Contempor-
ary World Business," International Studies Quarterly,




agriculture, steam navigation railways,
electric telegraphs, clearing of whole
continents for cultivation, canalization
of rivers, whole populations conjured out
of the ground— what earlier century had
even a presentiment that such productive
forces slumbered in the lap of social labour? 10
Thus, it is against the background of the Industrial
Revolution and particularly its reception in Marx's
thought as a progressive force that we are able to
recognize his conception of universal modernization*
"The bourgeoisie," Marx pointed out, "cannot exist
without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of
production, and thereby the instruments of society*
This revolutionary function of the bourgeoisie was not
to be confined to any national territory or a particular
region* It was the nature of capitalism, Marx argued,
to enmesh all the people of the world in the net of
the world market:
The bourgeoisie by rapid improvement of
all instruments of production, by the immensely
facilitated means of communication, draws all,
even the most barbarian nations into civilizations*.
. It compels all nations on pain of extinction,
to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it
compels them to introduce what it calls civiliza-
tion into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeoisie
themselves* In one word, it creates a world after
its own image* 12
10Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol* I,
pp« 38-39*
^Ibid * , p. 37.
12 Ibid . . p* 30*
10
According to Marx then, social development necessarilv
assume a catastrophic form. The ancient or traditional
order is violently disrupted by capitalist industrializa-
tion, and a modern pattern of thought as well as
modern social institutions unfold in the midst of this
social upheaval. In Marx's view then, the revolutionary
function of the expanding capitalism was twofold:
England has to fulfill a double mission in
India: One destructive, the other regenerating
—
the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and
the laying of the material foundation of Western
society in Asia. 13
Such an approach, of course, allows Marx to disassociate
moral indignation from historical judgment. Indeed,
he explicitly stated that the British colonization of
14India was immoral. ‘ However, after weighing the
immoral aspects of colonialism against its universal
l^Karl Marx, "The Future Results of the British
Rule in India"
,
in On Colonialism, Articles from the Few
York Tribune and other 'Writings , by Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels, compiled by International Publishers
Co*, Inc., (Mew York: International Publishers Co., Inc.,
1972), p. 82.
Shlomo Avineri takes important notice of this
in liis "Introduction" to Karl Marx on Co loni.nl ism and
Modern
i
z a t ion , ed. by Shlomo Avineri, (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 1-38, and
offers a penetrating analysis of Marx's view on modern-
ization.
14Marx, "The British Rule in India", in On
Colonialism, Articles, p. 36. "There cannot remain
any doubt*, but that the misery inflicted by the British
on Hindustan is of an essentially different and infinitely
more intensive kind than all Hindustan had to suffer
before. II
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revolutionary consequences, Marx concluded in favor
of the latter • "Whatever may have been the crimes of
England," Marx wrote, "she was the unconscious tool of
history in bringing about that revolution."* 5 The
significant aspect of Marx's discussion of modernization
in Asia is that he entirely attributes it to the
bourgeois revolution and technological change. This
stands in sharp contrast to his discussion on modern-
ization of Western Europe. In Europe, he tells us,
the Industrial Revolution itself was predicated on
prior changes in social institutions as well as social
mores. "From the serfs of Middle Ages," Marx writes in
The Communist Manifesto , "sprang the chartered burghers
of the earliest towns. From these burgesses the first
elements of the bourgeoisie were developed."*
0
In the
West, then, according to Marx's subsequent discussion
in Das Kapital . modernization constituted a series of
interconnected social changes which led to economic
diversification within an advanced industrial tech-
- I 7nology.
•*•5 Ibid . t p. 41.
*^Marx and Engels, Selected Works , Vol. I, p. 35.
17George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical
And Critical Study , (second edition, revised" New York:
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1965), pp. 155-157
12
The socio-historical development described
in pertained only to Western Europe. Marx
strongly emphasized this point in a letter to the
editor of O.techestvennve Zaoiski
r
("Notes on Father-
land") in 3,877, in connection with an article by a
certain Mikhailovskii, objecting to the latter's attempt
to transform, "My historical sketch of Western Europe,"
\v-rote Marx, "into a historico-philosophical theory of
the general path every people is fated to tread,
whatever the historical circumstances it finds itself...
But I beg his pardon. (He is both honoring and shaming
me too much.)" On the contrary, Marx had already
indicated, as was shown above in The Communist Manifesto
and other succeeding writings, that the process of
modernization in the non-Western world was to be
reversed. There, it was the historic mission of the
bourgeoisie to initiate a revolution from above by
laying down the material basis necessary for setting in
motion a social revolution in the East.
Did Marx perceive the non-Western world as
a world behaving to different criteria than those of
the Western world? Here, Hegel's influence on Marx
is profound. One respected student of Marx's ideas,
18Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected
Correspondence, (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing
House, 1953), p. 377.
13
Eric J. Hobsbawm, recently pointed out that, "... before
1848 ee e. probably they (Marx and Engels) knew no more
about oriental history than is contained in Hegel's
lectures on the Philosophy of History ... 1119 Hegel,
in his chapter on "The Oriental World" sees the oriental
world as static and devoid of any internal means to
change itself. This is because, according to Hegel,
consciousness in the oriental societies is expressed
in one person, the monarch, rather than on the society
as a whole. As a result, Hegel concludes that the
oriental societies exhibit, "... duration, stability—
unhistorical history... without undergoing any change
in themselves, or in the principle of their existence.." 4
During the summer of 1853, when Marx began
seriously to consider the non-Western world, he did
not discard Hegel's conceptual framework but merely
infused it with material content from the works of the
classical economists. The basic differences between the
-^Karl Marx, P r e-Cap j talist Ec oncmi
c
Formations E ed c by Eric J« Hobsbawm, trans. by Jack
Cohen, (New York; International Publishers Co., Inc.,
1964)
, p« 21.
2CGeorg W. Hegel, The Philosophy of History,
ed. by John B. Sibree, (New York; The Colonial Press,
1899 )
f pp. 91-105, quoted in Shlomo Avineri, H
egel 1 s
Theory o f the Modern State , (London; Cambridge
University Press, 1972V, p* 225.
14
two is that Hegel, an idealist, treats the basic
characteristics of the Oriental world as a philo-
sopfcical-psycholog ica phenomenon# For him^ history
is synonymous with the development of the conscious-
ness of freedom, Marx, on the other hand, a material-
ist, treats these basic characteristics as a socio-
economic phenomenon, and in the context of specific
social relationships# In other words, according to
Marx, it is not the thought that molds or determines
the existence and the experience, but rather, it is
the experience that molds the thought#
In letters and articles on the British
colonization of India, Marx and Engels set out the
fundamental characteristics of the non-Western world
or the Oriental mode of production#
On June 2, 1853, Marx, commenting on a
21
letter by Engels on Oriental cities and religion,
asserted that, above all, the fundamental peculiarity
of the non-Western world is the lack of private land
ownership# “The absence of private property in land,"
Marx wrote, "this is the real key, even to the Oriental
o o
heaven*.,." In addition, in the same letter, he





Ibid # . p. 99#
15
notes another significant distinction between the
Eastern and Western societies in the Nineteenth Century*
Marx points out the quite accidental development of
the cities in Eastern societies, and their strict
subordination to the monarchs or their satraps. In
the East, Marx observes that:
The King is the one and only proprietor of
all the .1 and in the kingdom, from which it
follows as a necessary consequence that a
whole capital city . like Delhi or Agra, lives
almost on the eirmy and is therefore obliged
to follow the king if he takes to the field
for any length of time. For these towns are
not, nor can be anything like Paris, being
virtually noth ing but military camps , only
a little better and more conveniently
situated than in the open country,, 23
Thus, there is a need only to produce what is essential
for subsistence of the individual and the community cf
which he is part. This means, Marx concludes, that
production remains, almost exclusively, production
of use values However, it is the development of
the production of exchange values in the towns, that
is, producing surplus over and above what is needed^
that makes possible preparation for the predominance
23ibid., p. 98.
^ ibid p „ "How such a great number of men
and animals, can subsist in the field....... So long
as they (the Indians) have their kicheri or mixture
of rice and other vegetables, over which they pour
melted butter, they are satisfied.... And the camels
graze in the open country where they eat whatever
they can find..... 1 *
16
25of capital. On June 6
f
Engels replied, approvingly
noting that, M 0 • •
•
the orientals did not arrive at
landed property, even in its feudal form. ...» 26 In
his view this was due to the climatic and geographic
conditions of the Orient. The property of agriculture
in the Orient requires grand hydraulic works.
"Artificial irrigation is here the first condition of
. 2 7agriculture...." This irrigation requires, Engels
states, nearly everywhere, a central authority to
regulate it and to undertake large scale works. As
a result, a centralized state, quite independent of
the economic factors of society, provides for public
2 Gworks, mainly the irrigation and the roads.
In two articles published on June 25 and
August 8, 1853, in the New York Tribune . Marx agreed
with Engels' analysis on the relation of desert-like
climate to public works in Asia. But there he added
another crucial characteristic of the non-Nestern
O c:
Marx, , Pre-Capitalist Economic Formation s,
p« 110.
°Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence,
p* 99#
^Ibid.
28 Ibid. Engels: "An oriental government
never had more than three departments; finance (plunder
at home), war (plunder at home and abroad), and
public works (provision for reproduction). See also
Karl A, Witt fogel , Oriental Desno ti s m: A Comparative
S tudy of Total Power , Chapters 1,2, and 9, (New liaven:
Yale University Pi ess, 1957).
society, what he termed the "village system" Marx
17
wrote:
The Hundu, on the one hand, leaving, like
all Oriental peoples, to the Central Govern-
ment the care of the great public works,
the prime condition of his agriculture and
commerce, dispersed, on the other hand, over
the surface of the country, and agglomerated
in small centres by the domestic union of
agriculture and manufacturing pursuits —
these two circumstances had brought about,
since the remotest times, a social system
of particular features — the so called
village system , which gave to each of these
small union their independent organization
and distinct life.
Therefore, Marx warns, "We must not forget that these
idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they
may appear, had always been the solid foundation of
. 29Oriental despotism."
This combination of highly cohesive primitive
village communities with a powerful centralized state,
according to Marx, enables the latter to concentrate
the greater of the social surplus product in its own
hands, which causes the appearance of social strata
maintained by this surplus and constituting tne
dominant power in society, hence the term, "Oriental
despotism". Consequently, the state, in the Oriental
society, is too strong and subjects thoroughly all
2 9 Ibid . . p. 41.
Marx, Pre-Capitalist Formations, pp. . 68-/1®
18
intellectual and scientific life to the requirements
of agriculture thus eliminating the possibility of
a process equivalent to that of the primitive
accumulation of capital and the formation of modern
industry and the proletariat which occurcd in Western
Europe. Thus, the internal logic of an Oriental
society is inclined toward stagnation and a high degree
of stability in basic production relations. 31
In the non-Western world, the "Oriental mode
of production" created a totally different socio-
economic and political culture from that of the Western
world. In the Oriental societies, the existing
social classes such as hereditary castes in India,
confronted by the powerful centralized oriental state
apparatus, can never acquire the social and political
power to initiate changes leading to feudalism, then
capitalism and eventually socialism. These classes
at best are only capable of desperate outbreaks.
They do not possess objective social power. That is,
the ability to paralyze production as a whole and the
ability to organize themselves collectively, two
characteristics which, according to Marx, are necessary
for a social class, the motive force of history, if
11 Ibid . . p. 70.
19
it is to initiate the transformation of the present
32day society. And since for Marx, social class, and
the development of production forces are the generators
of all social conflict and change, which ultimately
leads to human salvation, i.e., communism, he concludes
that the non-Western societies are devoid of any
internal societal mechanisms for change. If left to
themselves. Eastern societies would remain non-
dialectical and unchanging. Thus, his dramatic pro-
nouncement, mearly identical to Hegel's, is that,
"Indian society has no history, at least no known
history. What we call its history is but the history
of successive invaders who founded their empires on
the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging
society. 1,33
The consequences of such views on the nature
of non-Western societies led Marx to an endorsement
of European colonial expansion as the only guarantee
for modernization and change in the non-Western world.
This endorsement, it is important to point out, was
independent of any judgment about the morality of
^ ^Marx and Engels, Se lected Works , p. 34.
"The history of all hitherto existing society is the
history of class struggles." See also John Kautsky,
"Introduction", in Pol itical Change in Underdeveloped
Countr ies . ed. by John Kautsky, i.New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962).
3
3
Marx, "Future Results", p. 81.
20
this outcome. This is perhaps best revealed when
Marx says:
All the English bourgeoisie may be forced
to do will neither emancipate nor materially
mend the social condition of the mass of the
people,.... But what they will not fail to
do is to lay down the material premises for
both. Has the bourgeoisie ever done more?
Has it ever effected a progress without
dragging individuals and peoples through
blood and dirt, through misery and degradation? 34
And since l.arx's view of socialist society was
predicated upon a prior universalization of capitalism
it may be forcefully argued that colonialism like
capitalism is an historical necessity. He states:
The bourgeois period of history has to create
the material basis of the new world — on the
one hand the universal intercourse founded
upon the mutual dependency of mankind, and the
means of that intercourse) on the other hand,
the development of the productive powers of
man and the transformation of material
production onto a scientific domination of
national agencies. Bourgeois industry and
commerce create these material conditions of
a new world in the same way as geological
revolutions have created the surface of the
earth ,35
Capitalist colonialism then, is a precondition for
the achievement of a socialist transformation of world
society. In 1850, in a letter to Engels, Marx express
ed his fear that the socialist revolution in the West
may be jeopardized due to the slow pace of thoroughly
34 ibid . . p. 85.
35 ibid . . p. 87.
21
colonizing and modernizing the East. He wrote:
The specific task of bourgeois society
is the establishment of a world market
•....and of production based upon this*
world market. As the world is rounds
this seems to have been completed by*
the colonization of California and
Australia and the opening up of China
and Japan, The difficult question for
us is this; On the Continent the
revolution is imminent and will
immediately assume a socialist character.
Is it not bound to be crushed in this
little corner, considering that in a
far greater territory the movement of
bourgeois society is still in the
ascendent. J
5
Successful socialist revolutions, then, are only
possible first in the most industrially developed
countries. The weakest link in the world capitalist
system, for Marx, is where it is most industrially
developed, namely. Western Europe.
The principle impact of colonialism is its
modernizing effect. In the West, modernization
constituted a succession of interconnected social
changes which led to economic diversification within
an advanced industrial technology. In the Eastern
societies, according to Marx, due to their peculiar
socio-economic and political conditions, the process
of modernization was to be reversed. The bourgeoisie
3 6Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence ,.
p* 134
22
was to initiate the revolution from above in the non-
Western world by destroying both the powerful oriental
state and the primitive village communities. The
British cannot plunder India, Marx commented, without
at the same* time helping to industrialize it, ,! They
intend now on drawing a net of railroads over India,
And they will do it. The results must be inappreciable.
The railroad system will, become, in India, truly
a forerunner of modern industry,.,.. Modern industry,
resulting from the railroad system, will dissolve the
heretitary divisions of labor upon which rests the
Indian castes, these dicisive impediments to Indian
37progress and Indian power* , , , •
Such pronouncements seem to indicate that,
for Marx, modernization was not just the availability
of economic means but also of societal institutions
conducive to it, and perhaps even causing it. This
certainly is in line with his arguments against
mechanistic materialists that ideas do not simply
reflect material reality, but rather exist in a
reciprocal relationship with it. Marx, however, did
not fully elucidate the precise nature of this recipro-
cal relationship* As a result, his theoretical
3





scheme seemed to embody tv/o somewhat contradictory
principles reminiscent of the differences, such as
they are, in theology between predetermination and
predestination. This perhaps explains the appeal of
Marx's theory for both the Social Democrats as well
as the Communists. And although the distinction
between Marx's materialism and mechanistic materialism
did exist, in his writings, as seen above, the border-
line was vague from the very beginning and with time
faded out. In modernizing India, Marx observed that
the Englich bourgeoisie were, “to lay down the material
premises," for both, "the development of the productive
process," as well as, "their appropriations by the
people." In other words, the changes in material
conditions precede the changes in social modes of
thought as well as social institutions. For Marx,
psychological modernization unquestionably lags behind
material process. Social revolution then, is not
prior to modernization, but rather, Marx argues, is
the outcome of it.
At a certain stage of their development
the material forces of productions in society
come into conflict with the existing relations
of production. • • • Property relations. *.* turn




^Marx and Engles, Selected Work3 . Vol. I,
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In summation then, for Marx there are two
distinct types of underdeveloped societies, Western
and non-Western, The path toward modernization,
however, for Marx is only one, based on the Western
European model of development. Thus, it is obvious
that Marx, while disavowing, "the master-key of a
general historical—philosophical theory whose duality
is that of being super-historical," 39 indeed sought
tc impose a pattern on historical development.
However, he both overestimated the destructive impact
of the bourgeoisie, and underestimated the resisting
power of traditional institutions in the East to
Westernization*
p. 377 „
3-5Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence ,
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CHAPTER III
THE RECEPTION AND CHALLENGE
TO MARXISM IN RUSSIA
• THE CASE OF P.N. TKACHEV —
Having argued in the previous chapter that
40Marxism is a theory of and for the industrialized West,
our task for the next two chapters is to come to grips
with what has often been refered to as the "paradox" of
Marxism* That is, "Marxism" coming to power first in
backward and agrarian Russia rather than the industrial-
ized West, In the following pages, we shall examine
Marx's and Engels' image of Russia's social and economic
stage of development as it related to their general
theory of modernization. And, we shall also consider
the political thought of P.N, Tkachev, which in my
judgment, constitutes an important case study of the
reception and the transformation of Marxism in Russia.
Both Marx and Engles saw and appreciated the
great social changes that were taking place in Russia,
in the 1860 's* For example, the emancipation of the
serfs after the Crimean War and the Tsarist policy of
^Marxism, as defined here, is only what Marx
and Engels said and wrote.
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industrialisation. But it was only after coming
in direct contact with the emigre circles of Russian
revolutionaries that Marx and Engels began giving serious
considerations to rhe economic, social and political
conditions of Russia.
In 1847 in numbers 117 and 118 of Der Volkstaadt
Engels editorialized his observations on the emigre
literature of Russian revolutionaries and ventured some
guidelines as well as prospects for the revolutionary
movement in Russia. The main target of Engel's criticism
in the two editorials was P.N. Tkachev, one of the first
Russian revolutionaries to characterize himself as a
Marxist in public. Tkachev had published an article that
year in an emigre journal, Vpered . ("Forward"), entitled,
"Problems of Revolutionary Propaganda in Russia", in
which he argued that Russia was ripe for a socialist
42revolution. Engels admonished Tkachev for his belief
in Russia's readiness for a socialist revolution and
called him immature and a green schoolboy. "If your
people are ready at any time for the revolution, if you
41Engels, "The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism"
In, The Russian Menace to Europe , a collection of articles,
speeches, letters and news dispatches selected and ed. by
Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz, {Glencoe, III:
The Free Press, 1952), pp. 25-56.
42Peter N. Tkachev, Izbrannve Sochinenia .
("Selected Works"), ed. by Boris P. Kuzmin, Vol. Ill (Moscow
All. Union Community of Political Prisoners and Exiled
Settlers, 1933), pp. 55-88.
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have arrogated yourself the right to summon them at any
time to that revolution," Engels wrote, " then why do you




"Open Letter to Gospodin ("Mister")
Engels", Tkachev reproached Engels for his "total
ignorance 1 of the social conditions and the revolutionary
prospects in Russia. Any practical guidance offered by
Engels v/as useless and should not be considered seriously
by the Russian revolutionaries. Tkachev wrote:
What is needed is basic knowledge of the
situation. ... « And it is why your ‘lessons'
should provoke the kind of response you
would have exhibited, had a Chinese or a
Japanese learned the German language, but
who had never himself been to Germany nor
followed her literature, but to whom an
original thought occured to teach the German
revolutionaries from the heights of his own
Chinese or Japanese greatness about what
they should and what they should not do.
Therefore he continued,
...although we are in accord with the basic
socialist principles of a European workers
party we are not in agreement on tactics and
never will be or should be on questions
concerning practical realization of socialist
principle and the revolutionary struggle waged
in its name. The situation in our country is
totally exceptional, it has nothing in common
with the situation in Western Europe. The
means for struggle suitable to the latter,
are at the very least, suitable for us.
• e
43 Ibid p. 459
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We require a completely special revolutionary
program, which is unlike the German program,
insofar as the socio—political. conditions
existing in Germany differ from those in Russia. 44
The crucial point in Tkachev's argument is his emphasis
on uniqueness and peculiarity of Russia's social and
historical conditions. In Russia, he pointed out, the
social system differed radically from those in Western
Europe. In Western Europe, Tkachev argued, the socio-
economic system determined the content of the state, while
in Russia, he concluded, the state was not the product
but the producer of social "classes" and as a result, they
were heavily dependent on the state. The Russian state
V
Tkachev asserted, had no social basis and, as he put it,
was merely, "hanging in the air". This conception of the
Russian state and the prevailing socio-economic conditions
closely correspond to Marx's concept of Oriental despotism,
discussed in the preceding chapter, a condition where the
state stands above the economic and the social structures,
and totally subordinates the two to its own needs. And
Marx, as was already shown, favors the destructive role
of the western bourgeoisie in the East and her civilizing
historical mission in laying the "materia], foundations"
for the formation of social classes and class struggle.
44 Ibid . . pp. 80-89.
4 5 Ibid . . p. 92.
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which eventually results in the establishment of a
socialist society. it is clear that Marx's commitment
to support the global modernization and the v;orld
revolutionary cause was in accordance with his theory.
Tkachev, on the other hand, unlike Marx, was
impatient with the universal development of history. His
commitment to a socialist revolution was practical rather
than theoretical. Tkachev rejected the preparational
aspects for socialist revolution, both material and
agitational, and urged the Russian socialists to embark
on an immediate campaign of terror and violence with the
purpose of seizing political power and instituting
socialism* Because of Russia ’
s
peculiar socio-economic
situation, it was senseless for Tkachev to discuss its
revolutionary struggle in terras of prevailing economic
conditions and class struggle. Instead, Tkachev argued
that the revolutionary struggle in Russia was one between
the people and the state, the chief obstacle to social
development in Russia. However, although Tkachev did
perceive the Russian people in general as "instinctively
revolutionary, despite their seeming ignorance, and the
lack of consciousness of what they do,"*'
u
he was quick
to point out that because they were not intellectually
46 Ibid . . p a 91.
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ecjwipped, they lacked the knowledge of socialist
principles and direction, elements necessary for achiev-
ing the socialist order in Russia. Therefore, Tkachev
concluded that the realization of socialism in Russia
was to dc. accomplished by a small revolutionary party
of intellectuals imbued with superior social consciousness
and with advanced social ideals.
Anticipating Lenin’s What is to be Done . Tkachev
wrote, "Neither now nor in the future will the people,
if left to themselves, be able to bring avout the social
revolution. Only we, the revolutionary minority, can
do this; and we must do it as soon as possible." 47 This
small socialist-revolutionary elite, the spiritual and
the moral representative of the masses, could undermine
and finally overthrow the Russian autocracy if and only
if, maintained Tkachev, it possessed an organization
based on hierarchy and centralization of power.
Forshadowing the Leninist concept of democratic
centralism and the notion of subordinating individuality
to the party's cause, Tkachev asserted, "The individual
initiative is to be subordinated to the central leader-
ship which brings common purpose and unity (yedinstvo)
47 Ibid . . p. 268. "At the present time the
people are incapable of doing anything for themselves,
but in the near future even if they should get enlightened
and self—conscious the opportunity (for revolution) will
not exist."
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pointed out that it is not clear whether Tkachev views
this subordination of individuals as a condition desirable
in itself and therefore should be permanent. However, it
is clear that he does see it as a necessary evil that
should not be strictly limited in time and scone until the
desired goal, namely socialism, has been achieved. And
although Tkachev does not use the term, "the dictatorship
of the proletariat"
,
the notion, in the Leninist sense,
is clearly presented in his writings.
The revolutionary minority, having freed
the people from the yoke which had oppressed them
and from the fear of terror of the old regime...
directs creatively the destruction of the enemies
of the revolution. In this manner, the minority
can deprive the enemies of all means of resist-"
ance or counterattack. Then by making use of its
force and its own authority, it can proceed to
the introduction of new, progressively communist
elements into the conditions of national life of
the people from their age-old chains and breathe
life into its cold and dead forms. 49
This quote illustrates that the state was to be a creative
weapon rather than merely a distributive one of an already
developed abundance of wealth, as Marx conceived it would
be. As Professor Tucker writes, in his influencial study,
"The economic mission of the proletarian revolution," for
Marx, "would not be to develop the productive powers of
society, but to free them from the 'fetters’ clamped upon
48 ibid. . p. 447.
49 Ibid . . p* 266.
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them by the nature of capitalist society*" 5 ^ For Tkachev
on the other hand, it was after the socialist revolution
that the socialist state was to create simultaneously the
industrialized base and the economic wealth as well as a
new social order based on absolute equality, social
harmony and justice. 51
We should note that in the 1870‘s Tkachev*
s
views were not shared by a majority of the small group of
Russian Marxists. During this period, the Russian Marx-
ists, on the whole, were ideologically divided in their
views on Russia’s path of development. A majority were
of pessimistic conviction. They viewed Russia as having
been pushed behind the West by the historical process and,
therefore, destined to emulate tile Western path of devel-
opment. The small minority, adhering to an optimistic
conception, argued that capitalism was not an inevitable
and necessary stage for development in the direction of
socialism and, that capitalism was in fact undesirable
for the achievement of socialism in Russia.
Tkachev undoubtedly was the most forceful
proponent of the optimistic line of reasoning. According
^Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea . pp«
103-104 .
^Albert L. Weeks, The First Bolshevik: A •
Political Biography of Peter Tkachev . (Mew YorkT New York
University Press, 1968), p. 132.
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to him, the stabilization of capitalism in Russia would
certainly delay the socialist revolution or perhaps even
make it impossible. "As capitalist classes come into
being/* Tkachev wrote, "the chances of success of a
violent revolution will grow increasingly problematical.
That is why we cannot wait. That is why we claim that
in Russia a revolution is, in fact, indispensible for
the present moment. Let us not allow any further post-
ponement, and more delay. Now, or at the very least
52very soon— or never " For Tkachev, Russia's
backwardness constituted an advantage for making a social
-ist revolution. In a letter to Engels, Tkachev turned
the very backwardness of Russia into a privelege.
We do not have the urban proletariat this,
of course, is true, but we also do not have
the bourgeoisie. Between the suffering people
and their oppressive despotic government we do
not have the middle class; for our workers,
the forthcoming struggle is against the
political, power the power of capital here
is only in its embryonic stage.
You, dear sir, should know that the
struggle against the former is much easier,
than against the latter. . . « this regard,
we have better chances for achieving a
revolution than you. b ^
This quote clearly shows that for Tkachev, the non-exist-
ence of the Russian bourgeoisie was an important argument
for the feasability of a socialist revolution in Russia.
S^Tkachev, Izbrannye Sochincnia , ("Selected
Works"), pp. 69-70.
53 Ibid 0 , pp. 90-92.
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The weakness of Russian capitalism, Tkachev maintained,
meant that the Russian government in its struggle against
revolutionaries would lack support of an important
social force, which in Western Europe was the most
powerful antagonist of socialism. Or in other words, the
weak link of world capitalism, for Tkachev, was in the
backward and underdeveloped areas of the world. Clearly
such a view contradicts the determinism of dialectical-
materialistic conception of history which sees historical
process as a series of distinct but interdependent stages
progressing by means of conflict and resolution, with
each stage incorporating the accumulated experience of
the preceeding one. It is a process in which every
historical stage plays a valuable and necessary role and
where the very process of epochal transcendance, ( Aufhe-
biiag.)
,
is as much an incorporation as it is a rejection.
Tkachev, with his emphasis on the advantage of backward-
ness, substitutes the determinism of historical dialectics
with the notion of "historical leaps" or skipping stages
under the guidance of a revolutionary organization imbued
54
with higher moral principles.
We should observe that Tkachov's hostility
S^Tkachev' s notion of historical leaps was
developed in his essay on "The Peasants War in Germany"
( 1524-1526 ) , in which he attributed Munzer's failure
largely to a lack of organizational skills. Izbrannye
Sochinenia . ("Selected Works"), Vol. I, pp. 234~2aP>.
35
toward industrialization in general as in the case
of the populist ideologues. Furthermore, his notions
of revolutionary elitism were incompatible with the
populist principle of action through the people. It
should be clear by now that Tkachev was anti-populist
and not, as it is frequently asserted, a populist. 56
And despite his elitism and his non-deterministic view
of historical development, that is, elevating politics
over economics, Tkachev still, rather curiously, consid-
ered himself a Marxist of sorts. For, as he wrote, it
was beyond any reasonable doubt that,
all phenomena of a political, moral, or
intellectual nature, in the last analysis,
are the result of causal phenomena in the
economic sphere and the 'economic structure'
of society as expressed by Marx. The
S^The father of Russian populism, Alexander
Herzen, following his return from the West, where he
came into direct contact woth the urban proletariat and
took part in the revolution of 1848, wrote in "Ends and
Beginnings", in his liy Past and Thoughts , trans. by
Constance Garnett, Vol. IV
,
(London : Chatto and Hindus
Publishers, 1968), pp. 11-16, "I had grown to hate the
crowding crush of civilizations I looked with
horror mixed with disgust at the continually moving,
swarming crowd, it is content with everything and
can never have enough*. • This is the all powerful crov;d
of 'conglomerated mediocrity 1 ...."
56Ilichard Pipes, "Narodnichestvo: A Semantic
Inquiry", Slavic Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, (September, 1964),
p. 441. "Populist inspiration came from Herzen and
Chernyshevsky , and its strategy from Lavrov, Bakunin
and Tkachev*"
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development and direction assumed by the
economic bases of society are the condition
for the development and direction assumed
by political amd social relations in
general and make their mark on the intell-
ectual process xtself taking place in society-
on its morals, on its social and political
philosophies. « . . 5 7
This demonstrates that Tkachev’s social and political
views were indeed a curious mixture of hetergeneous
elements. Kis idealization of the small, morally superior,
revolutionary elite and his notion of "historical leaps"
or skipping stages were grafted in his scheme of ideas on
Marxian materialism and historical determinism. One
plausible explanation of this curious blend of incompat-
ible ideas, in my judgment, was due to the fact that in
his challenge to Western Marxism, Tkachev did not intend
to go beyond the tactical matters and into the fundament-
als of theory. Marx and Engels, of course, thought to
the contrary.
At Marx's urging, Engels replied to Tkachev's
challenge. His response, published in 1875, stressed
that a socialist revolution could take place only after
the intensive development of capitalist production and
the growth of the bourgeois-proletarian class struggle.
•And that the necessary condition of socialism is the high
57Tkachev, Izbrannve Sochinenia . ("Selected
Works"), p» 445. On this point, see also Weeks, The
First Bolshev ik
, pp • 134-135.
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level of economic development, a consequence of capital-
ist industrial!cation* Engels wrote:
The revolution sought by modern socialism
is the victory of the proletariat over the
bourgeoisie and the reorganization of society
by the abolition of class distinction* To
accomplish this we need not only the proletariat
which carries out the revolution, but also a
bourgeoisie in whose hands the productive
forces of society have developed to such a
stage that they permit the final elimintition
of all class distinctions.... Only during a
very high stage of the development of the
productive forces of society does it become
possible to increase production to such an
extent that the abolition of classes becomes
a truly progressive move.... This stage of
development is only reached under bourgeois
production. The bourgeoisie is consequently
equally as necessary a precondition of the
socialist revolution as the proletariat itself.
7k person who says that this revolution can be
carried out easier in a country which has no
proletariat or bourgeoisie proves by this
statement that he has still to learn the ABC
of socialism.''’
Engels' position was in perfect harmony with that of Marx.
For Marx, writes Professor Avineri, "...communism is
nothing else than the dialectical abolition ( Aufhebung )
of capitalism, postulating the realization of those hidden
potentialities which could not have been historically
59
realized under the limiting conditions of capitalism..."
58Engels, "Russia and the Social Revolution", in
Th e Russian Menace to Europe , p«, 205.
5 9sh1omo Avineri, The Social and Po litical
Thought of Karl 1,'irx, (London: Cambridge University Press,
1908 ) t pp* 150-151.
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Therefore, for Marx and Engels, there are no shortcuts
or leaps to socialism. A society, Marx wrote in Capita l.
" ••can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal
enactments the obstacles offered by the successive phases
of its normal development." Ke asserted that the non-
Western backward countries must pass through the same
phases of economic development that the developed
countries of the West have already completed. "The
country that is more developed industrially," he wrote,
"only shows to the less developed the image of its own
.
M 60future.
For Marx and Engels, Russia belonged to the
non-Western part of the world. In his letter to Tkachev,
Engels pointed out that the existence in Russia of "a
complete isolation of the individual village communes
from each other... is the natural basis of oriental
despotism... From India to Russia this type of social
structure has always found its completion in this form
of government. Nevertheless, Engels concluded that
the Russian revolution, led by the educated elements and
the incipient bourgeoisie, would occur prior to the
socialist revolution in the West. "A revolution," he
6^Karl Marx, "Preface" to the first German
edition of Capital: A Critique of Political Economy .
Vol. I, (Chicago: C.H. Kerr and Co., 1906), pp. 13-14.
^Engels, "Russia and the Social Revolution",
pp. 211-212.
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wrote, "which v/ill be of the utmost importance for
Europe, simply for the reason that it will destroy, the
last, until now intact, reserve of all European reaction
• #€>•“ ' The Russian autocracy was viewed by Marx and
Engels as the gendarme of Europe, whose elimination,
especially after the events of 1848, was crucial for the
r o
socialist revolution in Western Europe. However,
neither Marx nor Engels entertained any illusions about
the possibility of proletarian revolutions in backward
non-Western countries first. Both had expected an anti-
despotic revolution in Russia. This is the meaning of
their statement in the "Preface" to the Russian edition
of the Communist Manifesto . (1832), that the Russian
revolution would act as a signal for the proletarian
64revolution in the West. And it would be a misinterpre-
tation of Marx and Engels, in my opinion, to suggest that
toward the end of their lives they compromised their
earlier insistence that Russia was to follow the path of
Western Europe and that socialism as a form of economic
and political life could only follow, and never precede
62 Ibid . . p. 215.
63Avineri, Social and Political Thought of Marx ,
p. 255. In 1877, Marx also described the Russian state
as, "the unbroken bullwark and reserve army of counter-
revolution. "
64Lichthcim, Marxism , pp. 326-329.
capitalist development.
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Tkachev, on the other hand, perceived socialism
as a specifically Russian remedy to the unique problems
of Russia. Socialism, in his thought, was devoid of all
the economic and social content that it had in Marx's
thought; and was transformed into a purely political
concept. He emphasized the morally advanced revolution-
ary elite and their use of the state to create both the
material and psychological prerequisites of socialism
after the actualization of the socialist revolution. He
ignored the implications of Marx's concept of Oriental
despotism, despite Plekhanov's writings to him on the
despotic nature of the Russian state and the warnings
against its possible resurgence if the revolutionary
elite should seize power before the necessary objective
conditions matured. This was, incidentally, the same
warning that Plekhanov issued to Lenin two decades later.
Clearly then, it is not the social being that determines
social being. There is certainly nothing Marxian about
this view.
However, Tkachev did view himself as a Marxist,
considering himself not as an ideological, innovator but
rather being more concerned with the practical tasks of
modernizing Russia. The result was Tkachev's total
insensitivity to the question of ends and means m
politics, and his lack of appreciation for the complex
41
^ ®h*hip between practical matters and theoretical
considerations. Consequently, Tkachev not only failed
to elucidate his own theory of modernization but neglect-
ed to justify or incorporate his innovation into the
Marxian vocabulary. It is this fusion of Tkachev's ideas
with Marxian terminology that seems to be the key to
Leninism.
Let us then turn to Leninism, calling special
attention to certain common elements in the theories of
modernization developed by Tkachev and Lenin common
elements which, in my judgment, are important for our
understanding of Soviet "Marxism".
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CHAPTER IV
LENIN ' S TRANSFORMATION
OF MARXISM
Lenin was the first to carry out a "socialist”
revolution in an industrially underdeveloped country
without awaiting prior socialist revolutions in the
industrially advanced countries of Western Europe. As a
result, the product of Lenin's revolutionary leadership,
Leninism, emerged as a peculiar form of Marxism applic-
able to the conditions of semi-feudal, semi-colonial
and colonial nations of the Sast 0 In the following p£iges,
we shall examine those elements most characteristic in
the transformation of Marxism; Lenin's views on the
peculiarity of the socio-political conditions in Russia,
his concept of the Communist Party as the vanguard of
the proletariat,,, his views on the historic role of
Western colonialism, and his conception of the "dictator-
ship of the proletariat" as the creative weapon in the
construction of socialism in the East.
A close, examination of Lenin's theory of modern-
ization and revolution suggests that, at crucial points
of his intellectual development, he emphasized Russia's
unique and peculiar socio—historical deveJ.opment. In
his very first published work, • h a t th e 'Friend r: o f: the
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PeoELle.-. Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats
r
Lenin explicitly acknowlegded that Marxism, for him,
"aoes not base itself on anything else but the facts of
Russian history and reality..," 65
Russia's socio-political reality, as Lenin
perceived it, differed from the social and political
conditions of Western Europe. Consequently, he came to
the conclusion that, the Russian situation demanded a
different mode of revolutionary action that that of
Western Europe. Lenin however, did not stop at this
point, as did Tkachev, but went further, emphasizing the
need for a new theoretical formula to accommodate the
socio-political and economic conditions of backward
Russia. It is on this point that, in my opinion, we find
the most significant differences between Lenin and
Tkachev, as we shall see later. And it is this necessity
of action and theory, for Lenin, that constitutes the
basis for his conscious adaptation and consequent dis-
tortion of Marx's theory of modernization. In his
pamphlet, "The Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats,"
written in 1898, the year of the foundation of the
Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, Lenin summarized
his views on Marxian theory and its relevance for Russia.
65V,I. Lenin: Collected Works , ed. and trans.
by Julius Katzer, Vol. I, (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1566), p. 394.
He wrote:
We do not regard Marx’s theory as something
completed and inviolable. On the* contrary
,
we
are convinced that it has only laid the founda-
tion stone of the science which socialists must
develop in all directions if they wish to keep
pace with life# We think that an independent
elaboration of Marx' s theory is especially
essential for Russian socialists® for this
theory provides only general guiding principles
which in particular are ax^plied in England
differently than in France, in France different-
ly than in Germany and in Germany differently
than in Russia. 66
According to Lenin, the revolutionary struggle in Russia
was essentially between the Tsarist bureaucracy and the
“people", a view, we may recall, which was consistently
and relentlessly expounded by Tkachev to Marx and his
close followers two decades earlier# In his pamphlet,
quoted above, Lenin noted that in semi-Asiatic Russia....
numerous and varied strata of the Russian people are
opposed to the omnipresent, irresponsible, corrupt,
savage, ignorant and parasitic Russian bureaucracy." And
although this description does not conform to the Marxian
conception of class struggle in the capitalist society,
Lenin declared to the nascent Russian Social Democratic
Party that its great task was to unite these varied and
numerous strata of the Russian people, "into one whole.
6
6
Ibid. . Vol. IV, pp. 211-212
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into the single class struggle of the proletariat." 67
It is clear that Lenin makes no attempt to differentiate
theoretically the proletariat from the amorphous mass of
the "people". But as Krupskaya observed in her memoirs,
during this period (1898-1900) of his political and
intellectual development, Lenin 1 s primary concern was to
"translate Marxism into the language of Russian facts," 68
and not vice-versa. This translation, as we shall see
later, amounted to a deliberate transformation of Marxism.
Lenin's early writings already contained, in my
judgment, the seeds that proved to be crucial for his
later transformation of Marxism. These writings are
characterized by the lack of theoretical differentiation
of the proletariat from the amorphous mass of the
"people". This notion of the homogeneous oppressed
"people" rising against the parasitic state bureaucracy
connotes a nationalist rather than a class insurrection.
And it is this pattern of thought that provided the
intellectual springboard for Lenin's strategy of the
67 Ibid., p. 213. On this point see also Tucker,
The Marxian Revolutionary Idea , pp. 122-129.
68Rolf 17.K. Theen, Lenin: Genesis and Develop-
ment of a Revolutionary , (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1973),
p . 887
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69"worker-peasant" alliance. Moreover, this lack of
theoretical distinction between the proletariat and the
"people" invariably led to the non-recognition of the
proletariat's independence as well as the non-recognition
of its leading role in the socialist transformation.
However, it was not until some four years later, in Lenin's
What is to be Done? . after he had thoroughly familiarized
himself with the thought of P.N. Tkachev, that he ex-
plicitly and systematically repudiated the leading role
of the proletariat in the socialist transformation. But
in order to better understand the significance of TJhat is
to be Done? , in its transformation of Marxism, it may be
useful to recall the new developments in the Marxist
movement in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Centuries.
In the "Introduction" to the first reprinting
of The Class Struggles in France , in March 1895 — only
a few months before his death — Engels, indulging in a
rare moment of self—criticism, observed that the major
error made by Marx and himself at the time of the 1848
^Lichtheim, in his influential work, Marxism
,
p. 335, states that, "...the record shows that with
Lenin
the vision of 'total' revolution preceded the ' totalita-
rian* party structure. As early as 1898— four years
before he outlined the 'vanguard' condept— he was already
waging the strategy of such a revolution upon the nascent
Social Democratic movement."
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i evolution was that they treated the European situation
as ripe for socialist transformation. He wrote:
History has proved us, and all those who
thought like us, wrong. It has made clear
that the state of economic development on the
continent at that time was not by a long way
ripe for the elimination of capitalist
production; it has proved this by economic
revolution, which, since 1848, has seized
the whole of the continent and has made
Germany positively an industrial country of
the first rank...'^
As a result, he noted, the revolution of 1848 failed
because it was a minority revolution, "Even when the
majority took part," Engels wrote, "it did so — whether
wittingly or not — only in the service of the minority;
but because of this, or simply because of the passive,
unresisting attitude of the majority, this minority
acquired the appearance of being representative of the
71whole people," Therefore, Engels concluded, "Where it
is a question of a complete transformation of the social
organization, the masses themselves must also be in it,
must themselves already have grasped what is at stake,
what they are doing in body and soul. The history of the
72
last fifty years has taught us that.,,,." The
proletariat was to become fully cognizant of its role in





Ibid . . p. 130.
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history and its method of struggle through trade union
and parliamentary activity. Of the German Social-
Democratic Party, Engels said:
The two million voters whom it sends to
the ballot box with young men and women who
stand behind them as non-voters, form the most
numerous, most compact mass, the decisive
'shock force' of the international proletarian
army,,,. Its growth proceeds as spontaneously,
as steadily, as irresistibly, and at the same
time as tranquilly as a natural process,...
To keep this growth going without interruption
until it of itself gets beyond the control of
the prevailing governmental system, that is
our main task, 73
Four years later, in 1899, there emerged an
influential group of Russian Marxists, the "Economists",
who in their approach to Russian modernization attempted
to deal with the questions that Engels raised in his 1895
"Introduction" to The Class Struggle in France , Their
political programme called on the nascent Russian
proletariat to concentrate its str\iggle largely in the
economic sphere. The trade unions, the "Economists"
maintained, were the best schools forthe development of
proletarian consciousness. This position, we may add,
was not only consistent with Engels' argument in his
"Introduction", but was in harmony with Marx's position
as well, best illustrated in the latter's 1867 interview
with a German trade union official in which he asserted
73 Ibid , . p. 135
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that.
The trade unions are the schools for socialism.
In the trade unions, the workers are educated
to become socialists, because there they have
the struggle with capital before their eyes
day after day. All political parties whichever
they may be inspire the mass of workers only
temporarily, the unions however, tie the mas 3
of the workers to themselves permanently, only
they are able to represent a real labor party
and to oppose the power of capital. The
greater mass of the workers has attained the
insight that their material situation must be
improved, may they belong to any party they
like. But if the material situation of the
workers is improved he can devote himself
better to the education of his children, his
wife and children need no longer go to the
factory, he himself can better cultivate his
mind and look after his body, he becomes a
socialist without an inkling of it. 74
The "Economists", like Marx and Engels, also
relied upon the spontaneous movement of the proletariat
to yield the desired political results. The task of the
Marxist party, the "Economists" argued, was to adjust its
political aspirations to the historically possible at any
given stage. In concrete terms, of course, this was
interpreted to mean that Russia, still being largely in
the pre-capitalist stage, would first have to undergo a
74Kari Marx, in Volkstaadt . No. 17, (1869),
quoted in, John H. Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of
Deve lopment . (New York; John Wiley and Sons, Inc., ir.ub),
pp* 51~52<»
75 Ibid. Marx wrote: "If the trade unions are
to fulfilltheir functions, they must never be connected
with or made dependent on a political organization. -o
do this is to give them a death-blow..."
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revolution
, snti-xeudal and bourgeois in character, whicli
would replace the tsarist autocracy with a parliamentary
democracy. And the attempt to stage a socialist
revolution before the bourgeois order fully developed was
considered as an act of irresponsible utopianism which
was bound to fail and would delay the ultimate socialist
7 6transformation, ° Lenin, on the other hand, after a
short stay in Geneva in 1900, thought differently.
Lenin's stay in Geneva in 1900 was of crucial
importance for his intellectual development and crystall-
ization of Leninism. For it is during this period that
Lenin thoroughly familiarized himself with most of the
writings of P.N. Tkachev. This historical relationship
between the two men was noted by one of Lenin's close
associates, Vladimir D. Bonch-Bryevich, who was, in 1900,
the unofficial librarian for the Russian emigres in
Geneva. "Vladimir Illyich," (Lenin), Bonch-Bryevich wrote
in his memoirs, "read through and examined most carefully
all of this old revolutionary literature paying particular
attention to Tkachev, stressing that this writer was
77
closer to our viewpoint than any of the others."
76See Engels' reply to Tkachev, surra , p. 37.
77Vladimir D. Bonch-Bryevich, "Bibliateka i
arkhiv RSDRP v Zhencve" , quoted in, Weeks, The F.irs_t
Bol shevlk . p, 3.
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Furthermore, Bonch-Brycsvich observed:
Wot only did V.I., (Lenin), himself read these
works of Tkachev, he also recommended that all
of us familiarize ourselves with the valuable
writings of this original thinker. More than
once, he asked newly arrived comrades if they
wished to study the illegal literature, "Begin"
V. I. would advise, "by reading and familiar-
izing yourself with Tkachev's Nabat . „ . . This
is basic and will give you tremendous know-
ledge." 78
This profound influence of Tkachev on Lenin's thought
was most clearly evident in his famous attack on the
"Economists’' in What is to be Done? .
It must be strongly emphasized that Lenin, in
What is to be Done? . is not disputing the "Economists'"
claim that there is a positive correlation between the
maturation of the economic system and the improvement in
the material conditions of the workers. Kis dispute with
the "Economists" is over the assumption that this in
itself shows why the revolutionary class struggle would
necessarily follow. This, in my opinion, Lenin sees as
being the major shortcoming of the Marxian theory of
modernization as a theory of revolution. For Marx and
the "Economists", as we have already seen, this problem
was reduced to economic determinism.
Lenin did not see the economic determinants as




struggle in the midst of capitalist growth. On the
contrary, he saw this process of capitalist growth hinder
~ing rather than promoting the possibility of socialist
transformatj.on. He observed that the workers of Western
Europe, as well as Russia, with the maturation of
capitalism, found their own economic improvement on the
whole rather exhilarating depite the persistence of
inequality. The workers now hoped for a better life under
capitalism. And their attacks on the capitalist system
as a totality sharply diminished while their demands for
piecemeal economic and political reforms increased.
Lenin, in What is to be Done? , was the first
Russian "Marxist" since Tkachev to raise the issue of the
impossibility of the economic evolution of capitalism
into socialism. He was also the first since Tkachev to
express optimism in the possibility of achieving socialism
in Russia through the actions of a small centralized and
theoretically superior revolutionary elite. This elite,
Lenin maintained, was partly due to the peculiar features
of socio-political conditions in Russia, as well as the
"undesirable" tendencies exhibited by the workers in the
industrial countries. He wrote:
The history of all countries shows that the
working class, exclusively by its own efforts,
is able to develop only trade-union conscious-
ness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary
to combine in unions, fight the employers, and
strive to compel the government to pass necessary
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labour legislation, etc... The theory ofsocialism, however, grew out of the philo-
sophic, historical, and economic theories
elaborated by educated representatives of
the propertied classes, by intellectuals.... 79
In the above quote, Lenin following Tkachev's example
of distinguishing revolutionary instinctiveness from
revolutionary consciousness, also draws a sharp
distinction between "trade—union " consciousness and class
or socialist consciousness. The former, as we mentioned
above, was a spontaneous product of the economic struggle,
while the latter could only be introduced into the work-
ing class j.roin the outside by the theoretically advanced
Marxist intellectuals. "Modern socialist consciousness
can arise only on the basis of profound scientific
knowledge," Lenin asserted. "The vehicle of science is
not the proletariat but the bourgeois intelligentsia....
Socialist consciousness is something introduced into the
proletariat class struggle from without." 99
According to Lenin, the spontaneous labour
movement simply wastes the revolutionary energy of the
workers in sporadic clashes with the individual employers
and the government agents. They are disconnected and
79Lenin, Collected VJorks , Vol. V, p. 375. "By
their social status, the founders of modern scientific
socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the
bourgeois intelligentsia."
8° Ibid 0 , p. 383
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uncoordinated outbursts of dissatisfaction, in which
the workers give vent blindly, without the understanding
of the social order that confronted them and without an
image of the socialist society which was to replace it.
In order to become effective, Lenin asserted,
the labour movement had to be subordinated to the small
theoretica3.1y advanced Marxist revolutionary party which
would coordinate and guide the workers toward the
realization of socialism. In a "Letter to a Comrade on
Organizational Questions," September 1902, Lenin wrote:
While in the matter of ideology and of
practical control of the movement and the
revolutionary struggle we need the maximum
possible centr a 1 i r, a 1 1o
n
for the proletariat,
so far as concerns information of the move-
ment the center needs the maximum possible
decentralization . . . We must centralize
control over the movement. We must like-
wise decentralize as much as possible
the responsibility before the party of
each individual member. . .
.
In short then, the necessity of mature socio-economic
conditions for the transition to socialism, as postulated
by Marx and Engels, was simply rendered superflous by
Lenin. Thus, what we see in his early writings is an
®-^Again to show Tkachev's influence on Lenin,
let us compare the remarkable similarity between their
conceptions of the party organization. In an article
entitled, "What is to be Done Now?", Tkachev wrote: "The
success of the revolution is possible only with the
creation of an organization which welds together the dis-
parate revolutionary elements into one living body, acting
according to ono common plan, submitting itself to one
common direction— in short, an organization founded on
centralization of power, and the decentralization of
functions." Tzhrannye S och in en i
a
, Vol. Ill, P«
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implicit assumption that economic growth under capitalism
in itself does not constitute "progress", i.e., lead to
socialism. But, an explicitly systematic theoretical
formulation on this subject was not completed by Lenin
until 1516, in his well known work. Imperialism; The
Highest Stage of Capitalism .
ihere is an important continuity between What
is., to be Done? and Imperialism; The Highest Stage of
In fact, the latter, in my opinion, can be
seen as a theoretical explanation of the ideas advocated
in the former. That is, why the political organization
and the backward countries of the East had to replace the
general proletarian movement of the industrial West as
the initiators in the global transition to socialism.
Thus, Lenin’s theory of imperialism is an attempt to
explain the embarrasing fact of why the socialist revolu-
tion predicted by Marx had not materialized in the devel-
oped countries «, Let us now examine Lenin’s argument in
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism , emphasizing
those elements which significantly differ from the
original Marxian image of capitalism and colonialism*
Stated simply, Lenin argued that capitalism
o 2Alfred G. Meyer, presents an excellent
discussion of Lenin’s theory of imperialism in his
Leninism , (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers,
1957), pp. 235-256.
56
underwent sr dramatic change from the time of Marx to the
late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. As a
result, he maintained, Marx had not anticipated the
possibility of a capitalist system finding a way out of
its fully developed contradictions and the impending
revolutions by its expansion into the backward Eastern
part of the world. The East is then transformed by
the Western capitalists into a dumping area for surplus
capital and surplus commodities, as well as into a source
of cheap raw materials and cheap labor. It is this
expansion, Western capitalist expansion into the backward
East, that Lenin terms imperialism.
The result of this expansion by the ’Western
Capitalists and their extraction of super-profit from
the East, Lenin emphasized, enabled them to bribe their
own working class by simply granting it mere economic
benefits and extending its political liberties. "The
proletariat in the imperialist countries
,
a Lenin remarked,
"lives partially at the expense of hundreds of millions
^ “’This argument amounts to a falsification and
misrepresentation of Marx's ideas. For Lenin to suggest
that Marx did not anticipate capitalist expansion into
backward East, is r.o suggest that Marx's perception of
capitalism was national or regional in character. This,
of course, is not the case. Capitalism for Marx, is a
universal phenomenon which, "...draws all, even the most
barbarian nations into civilizations " For complete
quote see supra . p. 9.
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of uncivilized peoples." 84 The workers of the indust-
rially developed countries of Western Europe, according
to Lenin, have become the aristocracy of the world labour
movement and ceased being its vanguard. The conclusion
that Lenin drew from his analysis of imperialism was that
the socialist transformation will not occur first in the
industrially developed West where bribery and "trade-
union" consciousness were prevelant but, rather that it
would come first in the backward semi-colonial and
colonial countries of the East.
With time, Lenin attached more and more import-
ance to the role of the backward East in the global
socialist transformation. Speaking at the Second All-
Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the People
of the East, on November 22, 193.9, he stated:
The period of the awakening of the East
in the contemporary revolution is being
succeeded by a period in which all the
Eastern peoples will participate in deciding
the destiny of the whole world, so as not
to be simply objects of the enrichment of
others.
Lenin’s belief in the backward East as being the deter-
mining factor in world socialist development was again-
reaffirmed only four days before the stroke that incap-
acitated him, when he wrote:
84Lenin, Collected Works , Vol, XX14 , P« 281
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The basic reason for this tremendous
acceleration of world development is that
new hundreds of millions of people have
been drawn into it. The old bourgeois
imperialist Europe, which was accustomed
to look upon itself as the centre of the
universe, rotted and burst like a putrid
ulcer in the first imperialist holocaust. 06
Clearly then, Lenin's theory of imperialism marked a
dramatic departure from the original Marxian conception
of Western bourgeoisie being an agent of global modern-
ization. For Lenin, Western colonialism is the pillager
of the backward East and the cause of its impoverishment
and underdevelopment. It strengthened the bourgeoisie
,
the most potent adversary of the workers, by de-radical-
izing them, that is, instilling in the workers "trade-
union" consciousness
,
and hence, weakening them. As a
result, Lenin arrived at a conclusion similar to that
arrived at by Tkachev thirty years earlier, which was
that backwardness and the absence of the bourgeois class,
and by implication, the proletariat, were an advantage
rather than an impediment to the realization of socialism.
In a letter to the American workers in 1918,
Lenin wrote, "Ue know that circumstances brought our
Russian detachment of the socialist proletariat to the
fore not because of our merits, but because of the excep-
87 .
tional backwardness of Russia...." And in the following
^Lenin, Collected Works . Vol. XXXIII, p. 349.
87 Ibid . . Vol. XXVIII, p. 75
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year, in an address to the representatives of the
Communist organizations of the backward East, Lenin
declared, "You are confronted with a task which had not
previously confronted the Communists of the world, vou
must adapt yourself to specific conditions such as do not
exist in the European countries.*,, conditions in which
the task is to wage a struggle against medievil survivals
and not against capitalism." 88 Hence, it is important to
note that although Lenin's theoretical framework in
The Highest Stage of Capitalism , assures
that the backward countries of the East are "objectively"
,
or naturally, anti-Western and anti-capitalist, he equally
emphasized the importance, of the "subjective" factor,
Communist party control in these areas. Thus, as Lanin's
statements demonstrate, although he does not use such
terms as "historical leaps" or "skipping stages", the
notion is clearly present in his writings.
To bypass the capitalist stage of development,
Lenin, as v/e have already established, advocated an
immediate seizure of state power by the Marxist revolution
-ary elite, i.e., theCommunist Party. To be sure then,
however sincere Lenin may have been to the Marxian
commitment to "smash and destroy" the bourgeoisie state,





Vol. XXIII, p. 351
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the "dictatorship of the proletariat/' which he defined
as "the organization of the vanguard of the oppressed
B9as the ruling class." Lenin, like Tkachev, insisted
that the revolutionary elite, after overthrowing the old
order were to retain total control and power over the
social order.
^
In the hands of the revolutionary elite, the
state was to be both a repressive and a creative weapon,
repressive for the purpose of instituting power from above
for perfect social order and industrialization based on
socialist principles. "The proletariat," Lenin wrote, in
The State and Revolution , "needs state power , the central-
ized organization of violence, for the purpose of crushing
the resistence of the exploiters and for the purpose of
leading the great mass of the population— the peasantry,
the petty bourgeoisie, the serai-proletarians— in the work
89v«II. Chikvadze, Leninskoyc Uchenie o Dictatrre
Proletar lata t ("Lenin's Teachings on the Dictatorship or
the Proletariat"), (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1970),
p. 47. "The (state) apparatus — Lenin taught — need not
be smashed. We must wrest it from the subordination to
the capitalists, v/e must cut-off and eliminate the
capitalists with their strings of influence on it, and
must subordinate it to the proletarian Soviets."
90 Ibid . . p. 13. On the eve of the October coup,
Lenin wrote: "The doctrine of class struggle as applied
by Marx to the question of the state and of the socialist
revolution, leads inevitably to the question of recog-
nition of the political rule of the proletariat, or its
dictatorship, i.e., of power sharing with none...."
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of organizing the socialist economy. Thus, regardless
of v/ricit one may say about Lenin's conceptual ambiguities
and inconsistencies
,
it is safe tc say that his theory cf
modernization, unlike Marx's, elevated politics over
economics and indeed, assigned to the political super-
structure, i.e., the state, the creative role over the
economic substructure. Consequently, the economic
prerequisites, which were of primary importance for
socialist transformation to Marx, Engels and the Russian
economic materialists Akimiv and Plekhanov, became second-
ary in Lenin's thought.
In one of his last and perhaps least known
articles, "Our Revolution", published exactly one year
before his death, Lenin dealt not only with the Russian
revolution but with the approaching socialist transfor-
mation in the East. In it, he asserts that the indisput-
able lack of economic prerequisites for modernization can
be compensated by political prerequisites and that the
latter can and must become the basis for the former. "If
a definite level of culture is required for the building
of socialism (although no one can say what the precise
'level of culture' is, for it differs in every West
European country)," Lenin wrote, "why can't we begin by
91 Ibid , , p. 14
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first achieving the prerequisites for that level of
culture in a revolutionary way, and then , with the aid of
the workers’ and peasants' government and the Soviet
system proceed to overtake other nations?" 92
In considering this and other assertions by
Lenin, examined in this chapter, it is clear that for
Lenin, as for the founders of scientific socialism, there
are two distinct types of underdeveloped societies, the
"Eastern" and the "Western" . But, whereas Marx absolutized
the West European pattern of modernization and as an
economic materialist perceived the economic-technological
prerequisites preceding the modernization of consciousness,
Lenin, on the other hand, absolutized the Bolshecik and
the Soviet experience and perceived psychological modern-
ization, at least in a small group of Marxist revolution-
aries, prior to and indcpendedt of the economic, cultural
and technological development.
In other words, for Lenin, it is not the social
being that determines consciousness
,
butrather, conscious-
ness that determines social being. There is certainly
nothing Marxian or materialistic in this view. Moreover,
a view that excludes the material and holds the immaterial
or consciousness as the sole determiner of social trans-
formation is devoid of dialectics in the Marxian sense
479 .
92Lenin, Collected Works , Vol. XXXIII, pp, 470-
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of the term. Thus, in regard to the theory of modern-
ization, we may safely conclude that Lenin, under the
influence of Tkachev, stood Marx on his head.
In closing, we should point out that despite the
remarkable similarity in the political ideas of Tkachev
and Lenin, it goes without saying that there was also a
substantial difference. Tkachev, as we recall, was almost
exclusively concerned with a rapid modernization of Russia,
therefore, discarding the Marxian theory of development,
which relegated "Eastern" Russia to the tail end in global
modernization. Lenin, on the other hand, although primar-
ily preoccupied with modernizing Russia, also emphasized
the importance of the revolutionary theory for achieving
modernization. Thus, he consciously set out to transform
Marxism to fit the Russian reality. Or, as Krupskaya
cogently stated, to "translate Marxism into the language
of Russian facts." The facts however, as we have seen,
were perceived by Lenin from a Tkachevian rather than a
Marxian perspective. The result was the fusion of parochial
concerns with the universal terminology of Marxism.
Consequently, Lenin's thought is expressed in terms of
epochs and world development.
Nevertheless, in my judgment, Lenin remains
closer to Tkachev than to Marx in his views on modern-
ization and development. Lenin's question, like Tkachev's,
is, "What is to be Done?", which focuses only on the means
64
and not on the content of the action. Hence, effective-
ness and efficiency are the main criteria of any action.
Consequently, when Lenin concluded that the working class,
(the proletariat), could not accomplish the mission which,
according to Marx, history gave it, he without hesitation
substituted the Russian Communist Party^ for the
proletariat; and following the revolution, equated the
party with the Soviet state.
In Lenin's thought, contrary to Marx, there is
no separation between the realm of necessity, i.e.,
industrialization or modernization, and the realm of free-
dom, i.e., socialist transformation. Leninism is a theory
of necessity, or "What is to be Done?". Extending necessity
into the realm of freedom, stressing regimentation,
subordination and total suppression of the individual to
the Communist Party, the sole repository of historical
94truth, before and after the socialist transformation. In
short, Lenin's is a prescriptive theory of the methods of
overthrowing the old political order and affecting rapid
^Proletarian consciousness which, in Marx's
view is a property of the proletariat
,
in Lenin, stands
outside the thing of which it is a property. In this
respect, Lenin may be compared to Plato, who maintained
that the idea of whiteness was outside of white things.
^For the most recent account of the Party* s
excessive demands on the workers, after the October
revolution, see Alexandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag
Archipelago , trans. by Thomas P. Whitney, (New York:
Harper and kow, Publishers, 1973), n. 5, p. 13.
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industrialization from above in the underdeveloped areas
of the world* As one distinguished student of modern-
ization and development recently wrote:
Marxism is a theory of history* Leninism
is a theory of political development* It deals
with the bases of political institutionalization
the formation of public order... This is what
'
makes the Leninist theory of political develop-
ment relevant to the modernizing countries of
Asia, Africa and Latin America^-*
In returning then to the question that we posed
at the beginning of the previous chapter on the so-called
“paradox" of Marxism, we conclude that it is not a
"paradox" at all* For in fact, what came to power in
Russia in October 1917, was not Marxism, but Leninism.
95samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in
Changing Societies , (New Haven: Yale University Press,





OF MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
IN AFRICA AND ASIA
The Marxist—Leninist theory of modernization,
as Soviet ’’Marxist" ideology is usually called, has not
been static for the past fifty-six years. On the contrary,
it has evolved by a process of elimination, addition and
redefinition. In this final chapter, we will trace the
changing Soviet perceptions of non-communist underdevel-
oped countries, from Stalin through Brezhnev, and examine
Soviet theoretical schemes for evaluating modernization
or development prospects in these backward countries.
For Lenin, the cause of underdevelopment in the
East was Western colonialism and the world capitalist
system. Therefore, he was sure that the underdeveloped
East would be objectively anti-imperialist and anti-
capitalist in its path to development and modernization.
This is not to say that Lenin ignored the importance of
the subjective factor, that is, the role of the communist
party in the process of modernization in colonial and
feudal areas of the world. Consequently, when speaking
at the Second Congress of the Communist International
(Comintern), Lenin declared both the nationalist bourgeoisie
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and the conmunists of the backward East to be progressive
forces in the development of their respective countries
and the whole world* in other words, for Lenin, although
the Communists constituted the most advanced and most
reliable element in the process of development. Neverthe-
less, they did not have the prerogative on modernization
but rather shared it with the nationalist bourgeoisie.
After Lenin's death, Stalin also initially
advocated support for the nationalist bourgeoisie in the
East, In his lectures on "The Foundations of Leninism,"
delivered at Sverdlov University in April 1924, Stalin
declared that.
The revolutionary character of a national
movement under the conditions of imperialist
oppression does not necessarily presuppose the
existence of proletarian elements, the exist-
ence of a revolutionary or a republican
programme of the movement the existence of a
democratic basis of the movement,.., the
struggle that the Egyptian merchants and
bourgeois intellectuals are waging for the
independence of Egypt is objectively a
revo l ut i on ary struggle, despite the bourgeois
origrn and bourgeois title of the leaders of
the Egyptian national movement, despite the qy
fact that they are opposed to socialism.,....'
This view of the nationalist bourgeoisie as a revolution-
ary and modernizing agent was modestly altered by Stalin
^Lenin, Collected Works , Vol, XXXI, pp. 144-152.
^J,V<. Stalin: Xorhs . Vol VI, p. 148. "..in
other, larger colonial and dependent countries such as
India and China, every step of which along the road to
liberation even if it runs counter to the demands of
formal democracy, is a steam-hammer blow at imperialism,
i.e., is undoubtedly a revolutionary step."
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one year later.
In his report to the Fourteenth Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union on "The Immediate
Tasks of the Communist Elements in the Colonial and
Dependen c Countries , " Stalin asserted that in the countries
like Egypt and India, the nationalist bourgeoisie had now
split up into "revolutionary" and "compromising" factions.
The latter, Stalin stated, "fearing revolution more than
it fears imperialism, and concerned more about the inter-
ests of its own country. The victory of the revolution
go
cannot be achieved unless this bloc is smashed." Thus,
at this historical juncture, Stalin concluded, "The
communists must pass from the policy of a united national
front to a revolutionary bloc of the workers and petty
99bourgeoisie. ..."
This position of not underestimating the
revolutionary possibilities of the communists nor over-
estimating the idea of the national front was maintained
by Stalin until 1927. But the near massacres of the
Chinese Communist Party in April .1927 at the hands of
their revolutionary bourgeois allies, who until then were
considered to be revolutionary, brought about a dramatic
reorientation in Stalin's view on the problems and the
98 Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 149.
"ibid.
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policy of development in colonial countries of the East.
The Sixth Congress of the Comintern, held in
Moscow from July 17 to September 1, 1920, reflected these
dramatic changes in Stalin's perceptions. In the thesis
on t "The Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-
Colonial Countries," the Congress declared that the
national bourgeois betrayed the cause of revolution and
went over into the camp of reaction. 100 Industrialization
of the backward East based on capitalist principles was
declared to be non-progressive. "Capitalisu exploitation
operated by the British, French or any other bourgeoisie,"
the Congress declared, "Hinder the development of the
productive forces.... Real industrialization of the
colonial country is hindered." 101 And, the policy adopted
by the Congress called for an immediate transition to
socialism in these backward areas of the East. The main
prerequisite for real industrialization and modernization,
it was asserted, was the existence of a strong communist
party in control of the state apparatus. Thus, the
elements in the underdeveloped East were instructed to
concentrate on building strong communist parties. The
Congress declared:
100
Z!i£_ Communist International: 1919-1943
Document s , selected and ed. by Jane Degras, vol. II 1923-
1920, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 530-
531.
101 Ibid., p. 534.
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It is absolutely essential that the
Communist parties in these countries should
from the very outset demarcate themselves
in the most clear-cut fashion, both
politically and organizationally, from all
petty-bourgeois groups and parties. . . 102
It is clear that the Chinese experience of 1927 had a
traumatic effect on Stalin, shattering his optimism for
rapid world socialist transformation and shifting the
stress from the objective factors tc the subjective
factors in the Soviet scheme for world revolutionary
103development* And this was essentially the Soviet
position and policy until 1953.
After World War II, the Soviet Union bypassed
any effort to establish political and economic relations
with the newly independent states of Africa and Asia.
The nationalist leaders of these new states were viewed
by Stalin as suspicious and unreliable in the world
struggle between the Socialist and Capitalist camps; and
instead, the Soviet support was given to local comminist
parties to seize power. Thus from 1928 to 1953, the
Soviet theoretical formula for evaluating developmental
prospects in non-communist ex-colonial countries called
for immediate communist revolutions and claimed
3-02 Ibid . ^ p # 542
^^See also Frans Borkenau's W
o
r 1d Co n: mn .1 r. m t
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962),
pp. 332-357.
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industrialization and modernization as a prerogative of
the communist parties. 104
Stal3.n s death in March 1953, marked the turning
point in Soviet perceptions and policies toward the
ex-colonial countries of Africa and Asia. This change,
however, from the pessimistic and militant policy of
Stalin to the more optimistic and flexible policy of
Khrushchev, was not arrived at abruptly cr suddenly but
rather gradually. The persistence of the old Stalinist
concepts was evident long after Khrushchev and Bulganin
began courting the nationalist leaders of the new
. • 105countries.
In November 1954, I. Tishin, in Kommunlst . an
authoritative organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.
S.U.
,
in an article entitled, "The Struggle of the Peoples
of the Near and Middle East for Peace and Independence,"
stated that Nasser and the ruling nationalist bourgeoisie
of Egypt were compromising their country's interests by
conspiring with the western capital to exploit and
104Kax Beloff, Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far
East 1944-1951 , (London: Oxford University Press, 1953),
pp. 208-246.
105Jan F. Trisha and David D. Finley, Soviet
Foreign Policy. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968),
pp. 492-494. In addition to a series of personal visits
to Afghanistan, Burma and India, Khrushchev also extended
9.8 million dollars to Afghanistan and 134.8 million
dollars to India for economic development at 2%% interest,
repayable in 12 years.
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plunder Egypt, "The only element that is capable of
leading Egypt toward real industrialization and modern-
ization/' Tishin wrote, "is the working class and its
vanguard, the communist party." 106 And it was not until
the conclusion of the Soviet-Egvptian arms deal, with
Czechoslovakia acting as an intermediary that the changed
Soviet position on the national bourgeoisie and the
national liberation movements in the backward countries
of the East was officially revised, 10 ^
At the Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.
,
Khrushchev officially modified theory to accommodate
oo/iet poaicy changes in the underdeveloped world, A
significant aspect of Khrushchev's theoretical innovations,
it is important to note, is that they were based on an
optimistic assessment of the international situation.
For our purpose, we need only consider two of Khrushchev's
theoretical innovations, the three camp thesis, and the
thesis of different roads to socialism.
Khrushchev's "three camp" thesis officially
replaced Lenin's and Stalin's dichotomic world view.
According to Khrushchev's reasoning, a new anti-imperialist
force emerged after World War II, namely, the newly
independent ex-colonial countries of Africa and Asia.
106No. 16, p. 91.
10 ^See Molotov's "Address to the Supreme Soviet",
Prayda , February 9, .1955, pp. 1-2.
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This " third camp-*, he pointed out, due to the objective
laws of development, was necessarily moving toward
socialism* xne forces of aocialism were strong and
getting stronger, Khrushchev reasoned optimistically,
the forces of global capitalism were gettina weaker*
In effect, Khrushchev' s "three camp" thesis closely
resembled Lenin's theory of the weakest link of imperial-
ism* The progressive collapse of world capitalism and
the transition to global socialism was now largely
dependent on the struggle of national liberation. In
other words, the "third world" was now considered to be
virtually the deciding factor in the development of world
revolution.
Following the Twentieth Party Congress, Semyonov,
a recognized Soviet authority on the "third world" echoed
Khrushchev's "three camp" thesis in an article in
Kommun ist * He wrote:
their (the countries of the East) struggle
for political and economic independence for
their sovereign rights, is objectively an
anti-imperialist fight and shakes the big
imperialist powers domination in inter-
national relations and strengthens the
position of the peace supporters throughout
the world.
8
The second theoretical contribution made by
Ilanak, ed,
,
Soviet Foreign Policy Since
the Death of Stalin . (London: Routlodge and Kegan Paul
Ltd., 1972), p. 205.
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Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress was his
rejection of Stalin's Soviet model of modernization as
the only correct way to build socialism. He quoted a
saying of Lenin's, that, "All nations will arrive at
socialism, but not all will do so exactly the same wav,"^
Thus, the policy of demanding strict adherence to the
Soviet model of development was modified to allow certain,
but undefined in degree deviation from the Soviet path.
For the ex-colonial underdeveloped countries
of the Hast, the concept of "many roads to socialism"
implied that with Soviet assistance, the non-communist
nationalist bourgeoisie were capable of achieving real
industrialization and modernization. This was clearly
a dramatic about face in Soviet appraisal of development
prospects in the underdeveloped countries of Africa and
Asia. However, let us note that both the Soviet leaders
and the Soviet analysts of the "third world" up until
1960 had failed to elaborate on just how the "progressive"
states of the "third world" would make that necessary
transition to socialism.
In November I960, in the Moscow Declaration,
issued at the end of the Conference of Representatives
of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, the Soviet
109'rhe thesis of different roads to socialism
was reaffirmed in practice in the " Soviet-Yugoslav Joint
Declaration", Pravda , June 21, 1956.
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Union introduced a new theoretical formula for evaluating
developmental prospects of the underdeveloped countries.
This formula was entitled, "A State of National Democracy"
and defined as:
a state which consistently upholds its political
and economic independence, fights against
imperialism and its military blocks, against
military bases on its territory; a state which
fights against the new forms of colonialism
and the penetration of imperialist capital; a
state whcih rejects dictatorial and despotic
methods of government; a state in which the
people are insured broad democratic rights and
freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly
demonstrations, establishment of political parties
and social organizations) the opportunity to work
for the enactment of an agrarian reform and other
democratic and social changes, and for partici-
pation in shaping government policy.
And, "all the patriotic forces" in the underdeveloped
countries were called upon to unite in, "a single national
democratic front," to carry out these progressive tasks.
In concrete terms, this meant that the communists were to
complete the struggle against imperialism and feudalism
in an alliance in which they wore to be subordinate to and
under the leadership of the nationalist bourgeoisie.
The declaration, also stressed the transitory
nature of the national democratic states. It stated
that the main function of a national democratic states*
was to set in motion the economic and social forces which
^-^Danicl N. Jacobs, ed, , The Now Communist
Manifesto and Related Documents , (third revised ed.
;
New York: Harper and How Publishers, Inc., 1965) p. 223.
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eventually would overwhelm the nationalist bourgeoisie
leadership and force their replacement by the working
class and its vanguard, the communist party* Only the
communists
,
the Soviets argued, were capable of taking
the radical measures of expropriating both domestic and
foreign capital and relying on the Soviet Union for their
economic and political supporte Thus, according to the
theory of "national democracy," the transition to
socialism was dependent upon the growing influence and
the eventual preponderance of the communist parties in
the united national front coalitions. The significant
aspect of this theory is that it did not draw a strict
dichotomy between politics and economics or assume the
primacy of the former over the latter. Instead, it fused
the two and in a deterministic fashion, and elevated
economics over politics.
From 1961 to 1963, a number of important
economic and political developments in the non-communist
underdeveloped countries again prompted the Soviets to
revise their formula for evaluating developmental
prospects in these ex-colonial areas. Nationalist
bourgeois leaders like Ben Bella of Algeria, Nasser of
Egypt, Nkrumah of Ghana and Sukarno of Indonesia, extended
the state sectors of their economies by nationalizing all
of large-scale industry and the greater part of small-
scale industry and, in the process, moved to a policy of
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greater reliance on the Soviet Union. This was certainly
far beyond the expectations of Moscow reflected in the
theory of "national democracy". Hence, theory again was
modiif ied to accommodate these unexpected developments in
the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia. In
•^963, the theory of "national democracy" was supplanted
with the theory of "revolutionary democracy", the non-
capitalist path of development.
While "national democracy" implied a two stage
process in which the nationalist bourgeois were bound
to promote capitalism but, in turn, were to be super-
ceded by socialism, the "revolutionary democracy" on the
other hand, asserted that certain segments of the
nationalist bourgeoisie were capable of bypassing the
capitalist stage and leading their countries along the
non-capitalist path of development. That is, it was
capable of undertaking radical measures of expropriations
of both domestic and foreign capital, as well as support-
ing the Soviet Union in any ensuing conflict with the
West,, G. Mirskyi, a noted analyst of the Middle East,
claimed that the revolutionary democratic regimes
constituted the best guarantee for rapid and resolute
transition to socialism. He wrote:
The doctrines and dogmatists will reply:
wait. Restrict the movement to the aims of
bourgeois democratic revolution, and promote
capitalism in the anticipation that the
working class will mature sufficiently to
lead the socialist revolution. Experience,
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however, has shown that in our day with the
socialise world, system so decisively
luencincj the course of world events this
j.oncf 'classical 1 path is by no means
obligatory. The national liberation
revolution can immediately break out of the
framework or bourgeois democratic revolution
and begin the transition to socialist
revolution..,,.. if the conditions for the
proletarian leadership have not yet matured
the historic mission of breaking” with
capitalism can be carried out by elements
close to the working class. Nature abhors
vacuum, hi
There were great expectations that the
revolutionary oemocrats" would embrace communism and
declare their countries "socialiat"
,
as did Castro in Cuba.
Terms like African socialism, Arab socialism and Islamic
socialism were now gaining currency in the Soviet press,
Ben Bella, for instance, after being awarded the title,
"Hero of the Soviet Union", was quoted in Pravda as
having promised, "to continue in the socialist road
112of development." ' Let me again stress that this theoret-
ical revision, which further emphasized the objective
factors of social development over the subjective, i.e.,
the hegemony of the communist party, reflected the optimism
of the Soviets as a result of pre-Soviet developments in
the ex-colonies of Africa and Asia.
Kirskyi, "The Proletariat and National
Liberation", New Times , Ho. 18, 1964, pp. 8-9.
112Ben Bella, "V Borbe za mir i Progess", ("In
The Struggle for Peace and Progess"), Pravda , May 7, 1964,
p. 1*
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Khrushchev fell in October 1964, and his
successors, Brezhnev and Kosygin continued his general
policy toward the underdeve3.oped world and adopted his
thecx etical formulas for evaluating developmental
prospects in the ex-colonial countries of the East.
However, beginning with 1965 and after, a number
of important changes occured in the "third world". These
important events had their repercussions on Soviet
perceptions of development prospects in the "third world".
1965, Ben Bella and Sukarno were overthrown
by military regimes. Their policies of extending the
state sectors of the national economies v/as almost immed-
iately reversed by the new military leadership, who granted
concessions to domestic and foreign capital. Thus, on
June 4, 1965, A. Iskenderov, writing in Pravda . observed
that, "The implememtation of radical and progressive
measures such as nationalization and agrarian reforms, do
113not automatically lead to socialism." And, G. iiirskyi,
an early protagonist of the theory of "revolutionary
democracy" and non-capitalist development, in November
1965, admitted that the optimism of his previous writings
was premature and warned of a noticeable trend to the
113r«uroki Borby za Edinstvo", {"Lessons of the
Struggle for Unity"), p. 3.
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right in many "third world" countries. 114
The notion of different nationalist types of
socialism, used widely under Khrushchev, was now being
repudiated in the Soviet press. Feder Burlatskyi, an
often cited authority on ideological matters, in an




There is not and there cannot be a Russian,
German, Chinese or African socialism.... The
*
bourgeoisie leaders who try to justify their
personal rule and dictatorial powers by the need
to overcome the difficulties of building
socialism underestimate rhe need to relv on a
political party ’with socialist aims which
results in many cases with a retreat from the
struggle of socialism. . Communists welcome
all social forces genuinely striving for
socialism but they do not wish to be dissolved
among them. i 15
This clearly signifies a reassessment of the deterministic
and materialistic aspects of "revolutionary democracy"
and non-capitalist development. Burlatskyi' s argument
now emphasized the need for a more independent and
vigorous communist activity in the "third world"
.
^4G. Mirskyi, "Klassy i Klassovaia Borba v
Razvivajushcheja Stranah"
,
{"Classes and the Class
Struggle in the Developing Countries"), Hirovala tkono-
milca i Jlezhdunarcdnove Otnoshonia . No. 3, March, 1966 p. 65.
H5j\Ugust 15, 1965, p. 4. See also 17. D.
Kosukhin, "Kontseptii Africanskogo Sotsialisma v Tanzanii
i Kenii"
,
("Conceptions of African Socialism in Tanzania
and Kenya"
) ,
Sovremenvo Toorii Sotsialisma Natslonalnaao
Tipa t ("Contemporary Theories o.; Socialism of the National
Tvpe"), ed. by L.M. Zhukov, (Moscow: Izdatolstvo Mysl,
1967), pp. 250-251.
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In 1966, Nkwameh Nkrumah of Ghana, another
Soviet typed "revolutionary democrat" was toppled by a
military regime. Following the coup in Ghana, the Soviet
commentators on the "third world" began to echo Burlatskyi's
argument, attributing the reversals in the "revolutionary
democratic" states to the, "absence of a well-organized
vanguard party capable of rallying the masses to the
defense of their gains." Thus, the determinism, or the
primacy of the objective factors, following the Soviet
reversals in Algeria, Ghana and Indonesia, was discarded
and replaced by the "leading stratum" or vanguard theory
of modernization.
The term, non-capitalist development, first used
in conjunction with the theory of "revolutionary demo-
cracy"
,
was now redefined and given a new meaning. "The
non-capitalist path of development," one Soviet comment-
ator stated, "does not constitute some sort of a 'Third'
117road this path is socialist." Several Soviet
analysts proclaimed Mongolia to be the new model of non-
118capitalist development.
^^-^Thierno Amath, "Some Problems of Tropical
Africa"
,
World Marxist Review , Vol. IX, No. 8, (August,
1966) , p." 33
117E.G. Sharapova, Natsionalino-osvoboditelnoyo
Dvizhenie — Chast Mirovoco Rcvolutsionnogo Processed C"Th
e
National Liberation Movement — Part of the World
Revolutionary Process"), (Moscow: Publication of Moscow




*^2 first elaboration on the newly revised theory of




In an article entitled, "Lenin's Concept of Non-capitalist
Development and the Present," in Voprosy Istorii . he
asserted that the implementation and the preservation of
socio-economic prerequisites for non-capitalist develop-
ment were dependent, "on an active dedication of their
leaders and other cadres to the ideals of socialism, the
growing organizational standards of the proletariat and
their influence in the affairs of the state, as well as
the close alliance with the world socialist systems,
constitute the most important internal and external
liqguarantee for non-capitalist development*" ' Cleariy,
non-capitalist development for Ulianovskyi is, above all,
a political phenomenon and not just economic growth. It
denotes the communist accession to power in order to
"paralyze the growing influence of the national
120
capital." And, C-. Mirskyi, m his most recent essay
in Kommimist . added that economic growth not based on
p. 126.
Ulianovskyi, No. 4, (April, 1970),
•*-20 jb.id . . p. 12 7.
03
socialist, principles is, "growth without development." 121
This signifies a return to the strict dichotomy between
and the primacy of politics over economics in the Soviet
theory of modernization and development. The concept of
backwardness or underdevelopment has been drained of its
economic and social content and is being defined simply
in terms of ideology and politics.
However, an important and peculiar feature in
recent Soviet writings on modernization and development
has been that despite the renewal of the militant vanguard
or the "leading stratum" theory of modernization, the
Soviet analysts are openly admitting its irreconcilability
with the socio-political reality in the "third world".
Conditions are not yet ripe for undivided political power
to go into the hands of the working people,," Ulianovskyi
wrote. "Participation of the national bourgeoisie in
political power is due to their being better prepared
politically, ideologically, organizationally, and
economically than any stratum for active political life,
and participation in political power." Thus, the
Kirskyi, "Osobennye Zadachi Natsionalno-
Revolutsicr.ogo Dvizhnia"
,
('Special Tasks of the National
Liberation Movement"), No. 9, (June, 1974), p. 125. See
also G.F. Kim and P.M. Shastiko, “Nekotorye Problemy
Sovremenyh Natsionalno-Osvoboditelnyh Revolutsyi v




"Lenin's Concept", p. 129.
Q4
current Soviet policies of compromise and cooperation
with nationalist bourgeoisie in the "third world", nearly
identical, incidently, to those pursued by Khrushchev,
^t’e termed as oeing realistic, under the present
conditions, and advantageous to the cause of international
proletarianism, i.e., the Soviet Union, 123 But, there is
no indication at this time in Soviet literature of the
recognition of the possibility and ability of many under-
developed countries to "develop" in directions other than
those envisaged by the Karxist-Leninist theories of
modernization and development. Certainly any approach
that does not take into account the historical and
cultural factors of the process of modernization in the
uncerdeveloped countries cannot be considered to be
realistic. Instead, divorcing theory from policy and
focusing more on the question of immediate action is a
sign of practical and opportunism rather than realism and
necessity by the Soviets.
In summarizing Soviet formulas for evaluating
the modernizing and developmental prospects, and Soviet
123por this strange inconsistency between theory
and policy, see V. Kondratyev's "An Important Prerequisite
for Social Progress," International Affair s , Moscow: No* 4,
(April, 1974), pp. 47-52; and, A. Levkovskyi, "Spetsifika
i Granitsy Capital izma v Perehodnom Obshchestve ' Trerego
Mira'", ( "Specifications and Limits of Capitalism in the
Transitional Societies of the 'Third World'", Mi rovaia
Ekonomika i Kozhdunarodnye Otnoshenia , No, 1, (January,
1974), pp. 112-120.
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policies in the "third world" for the past fifty-six years,
we must conclude that both the formulas and the policies
have been in constant reappraisal and revision. However,
while we have seen theory make a full circle, from Stalin's
militant vanguard theory of modernization, to the deter-
ministic and materialistic formulas of Khrushchev, and
back again to the militant vanguard or "leading stratum"
theory of modernization today, this has not beer; the case
in the realm of policy* The remilitarization of theory,
from 1965 on, was not accompanied by the militarization
of Soviet policy toward the "third world".
This distinction between what is desirable and
what is possible, that is, between theory and action, is
a peculiar feature of recent Soviet literature on nicdern-
ization and development. This sets it apart from previous
Soviet writings on that subject and, constitutes a
significant departure from the long established practice
of simply adjusting theory, or ideology, to fit Soviet
foreign policy in the "third world".
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CONCLUSION
There are two distinct traditions in the Karx-
ist-Leninist theory of modernization and development.
While Marx wrote in responce to the problems of the
industrially developed West, he in the process,
absolutized the West European model of development.
The economic phenomena and consequently the socio-political
characteristic of Western Europe in Marx's view was
universally compulsive. Or as he stated in his Das
Kapital , "The country that is more developed industrially
only shows to the less developed the image of its own
future." According to Marx then, no society could leap
through history or bypass the socio-economic stages of
developement. Every society had to pass through the
capitalist stage in its path toward communism. Indeed,
without the highly developed capitalist production for
Marx the ultimate stage of history was unattainable.
Thus, this impetus for global modernization for Marx
erainated from Western Europe in the form of colonialism.
Lenin, on the other hand, whose eminent fore-
runner was the non-Marxist Russian intellectual P.N.
Tkachev, wrote in response to the problems peculiar to
the agrarian and backward East. For Lenin, -estern
colonialism, i.e®, imperialism, was not a vital
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and revolutionary phenomenon but rather a parasitic force
signifying the death or the last stage of world
capitalism. It was this exploitation of the backward
East, Lenin contended, that enabled the Western capital-
ists to bribe their working class with the extra profits
from the colonies and extinguish the revolutionary
potential in Western Europe. Consequently, according to
Lenin, the impetus for world socialist developement
erainated not from the industrial West, but rather from
the agrarian and backward countries of the East, who
are then naturally or objectively allies of the Soviet
Union in its struggle against world capitalism. Therefore
what we hsive established in the preceding chapters is
that the Marxist-Leninist theory of modernization, as
the Soviet theory of modernization is called, is a
misnomer insofar as it implies Marx to be the precursor
of Lenin and consequently treats Leninism as the
realization of Marxist unity of theory and practice.
In assessing the various Soviet formulas for
evaluating modernization and development in the non-
comminist underdeveloped countries in the last fifty-
six years, it is clear that they are all based on Lenin's
theory of imperialism. And Soviet literature has
shown no visible attempt to alter Lenin's theoretical
achievement. The simple dichotomy of Lenin's system
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which envisaged the backward societies develooing in
the direction of the Soviet model
r
has on the whole
been retained. Basically the Soviet writings on
modernization examined in this study lack three important
consideration in their assessment of the underdeveloped
world. First, they do not recognize the great variability
different types of underdeveloped and modern societies
beyond the ones envisaged by both Marx's and Lenin's
theories of modernization, 1 Secondly, they do not
recognize that the underdeveloped countries may be
developing in directions other than those posited by
2Marx and Lenin, And finally, the Soviet writers fail
to take into account the importance of historical and
cultural factors in the process of modernization,
^
However, even though Soviet writings have not altered
Lenin's theory of modernization, there have been variations
or shifts within his theory which are significant in
themselves.
Throughout these shifts, from emphasis on the
importance of the subjective factors, i„e., the role of
Chong-Do-Hah and Jeanne Schneider, "A Critique
of Current Studies on Political Development and Modern-
isation", Social Research , (3.968), Vol» 35, pp, 130-159,
^A. R, Desai, Essays on Modernizati on of Under-
developed Societies . (Bombay: Thacker and Co,, 1971)7
^Chong-Do-Hah and Schneider, "A Critique' 1 , p, 130-
159 .
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the communist party, in the process of modernization,
1928to 1955; to emphasis on objective factors in 1956;
and back again, at present, to emphasis on the subjective
factor, we see that this pattern has been a response to
the successes and failures of Soviet foreign policy in
the "third world". In 1928, and in 1965, for example,
the emphasis on the subjective factor in the Soviet
theory of modernization and development was occasioned
by the catastrophic and traumatic setbacks in Soviet
foreign policy in the underdeveloped world. Khrushchev's
emphasis on the objective factors in Lenin's theory
of modernization, on the other hand, reflected for the
most part his success in influencing the nationalist
bourgeoisie through his policies of economic and
military aid.
As we noted in the last chapter, there is a
distinction between theory and policy in the recent
Soviet literature on modernization and development which
precludes the conclusion that Soviet theory wholly depends
on policy and consequently, simply reflects it.
Recent Soviet literature on modernization and
development, with its espousal of a theory that is
militant in structure and its advocation of policies
that are compromising and conciliatory in content,
stringly suggests that the Marxist-Leninist theory of
modernization, above all, is an indicator of the successes
and failures of the Soviet Union in penetrating the
ex-colonial underdeveloped countries of the East.
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